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Abstract
Clinical notes, which can be embedded into
electronic medical records, document patient care
delivery and summarize interactions between healthcare
providers and patients. These clinical notes directly
inform patient care and can also indirectly inform
research and quality/safety metrics, among other
indirect metrics. Recently, some states within the
United States of America require patients to have open
access to their clinical notes to improve the exchange of
patient information for patient care. Thus, developing
methods to assess the cyber risks of clinical notes before
sharing and exchanging data is critical. While existing
natural language processing techniques are geared to
de-identify clinical notes, to the best of our knowledge,
few have focused on classifying sensitive-information
risk, which is a fundamental step toward developing
effective, widespread protection of patient health
information. To bridge this gap, this research
investigates methods for identifying security/privacy
risks within clinical notes. The classification either can
be used upstream to identify areas within notes that
likely contain sensitive information or downstream to
improve the identification of clinical notes that have not
been entirely de-identified. We develop several models
using unigram and word2vec features with different
classifiers to categorize sentence risk. Experiments
on i2b2 de-identification dataset show that the SVM
classifier using word2vec features obtained a maximum
F1-score of 0.792. Future research involves articulation
and differentiation of risk in terms of different global
regulatory requirements.
1. Introduction
Medical data can be misused in many ways,
from business profiteering and mandatory governmental
controls to an individual’s identity theft. Due to
the enormous impacts of identity theft and other
unauthorized usages of medical data, governments are
gradually developing privacy and security regulations.
Examples of such regulations include the United
States’ Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) of 1996 [1], The Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH) of 2009 [2], the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [3], and the
Chinese Cybersecurity Law [4]. In addition to
regulations protecting the privacy and security of
clinical data, states are conforming to the United
State’s 21st Century Cures Act [5], requiring healthcare
providers to provide clinical data information. As
healthcare data becomes more freely available, data
providers need to identify security and privacy risks
within shared Electronic Health Records (EHR) and
to lower privacy and security risks to patients and
healthcare entities.
We classify clinical note sentences in terms
of risk of containing patient health information
(PHI). We solve a novel problem as prior to
our contribution, researchers reported solely on
methodologies for clinical note de-identification. We
discuss de-identification in the literature review as
we could not find any clinical note PHI risk
classification literature. Our classification methodology
is closely related to de-identification but unique in
that classification can be employed for other purposes.
For example, classification could transpire upstream or
downstream from de-identification to classify risk type
pre- or post- de-identification. If we implement risk
classification pre- or upstream from de-identification,
then we could perhaps classify different types of risks to
be passed to different de-identification methodologies.
If we implement risk classification post- or downstream
from de-identification, then we could perhaps catch
sentences that were not properly de-identified. In
addition, we predict that classification may simplify the
computing resources needed to keep pace with the large
quantity of data being produced daily by healthcare
facilities as sharing clinical notes directly with patients
and for research, while maintaining privacy and security,





is an international challenge. Recently, for example,
OpenNotes became an “international movement to
create partnerships toward better health and health care
by giving everyone on the medical team, including the
patient, access to the same information [6].”
We employ natural language processing (NLP)
to identify the risk of containing protected PHI in
clinical notes by classifying sentences in terms of risk
based on the presence of sensitive information such
as PHI. We use the Harvard Clinical NLP dataset for
our analysis. The datasets were initially created at
a former National Institute of Health (NIH)-funded
National Center for Biomedical Computing, known as
Informatics for Integrating Biology and the Bedside
(i2b2) [7, 8]. We present current literature, data, and our
novel risk-classification based methodology. Finally,
we present the results where the top-performing system
obtained an F1-score of 0.792 for correctly identifying
the risk using word2vec and SVM classifier.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first
present related work in Section 2. Then, we describe
the data and methods in Section 3, followed by our
experimental setup, results, and discussion in Section 4.
We conclude with future work in the last section.
2. Related Work
NLP for patient information de-identification and
risk mitigation has been developed extensively over the
past decade. However, direct research for clinical note
classification as introduced by our research does not
exist. Therefore, to provide a state-of-the art literature
review we built it on entirely different but closely related
privacy and security challenges. These challenges
revolve around three other pillars of literature related
to de-identifying medical notes. First, there has been
a need to develop accessible medical data benchmarks
to evaluate de-identification methods. Second,
techniques have been produced for de-identifying
English language medical records using NLP. Third, the
industry has expanded de-identification English-based
NLP techniques to de-identify non-English medical
records. Finally, to reiterate, these three pillars
of de-identification research literature solve entirely
different privacy and security challenges than our
particular research contribution.
Gold Standard PHI Benchmarks: Building gold
standard PHI de-identification benchmarks for NLP
tasks has been an ongoing effort over the past two
decades. In the early 2000s, most corpora developed
to measure the performance of de-identification systems
were either not publicly available for privacy reasons,
or were incomplete as they were either synthetically
generated or composed of only a few document
types (e.g., discharge summaries, pathology reports,
nursing progress notes, outpatient follow-up notes,
and medical message boards). Mayer et al. [9]
introduced a human/manual inductive creation of an
annotation schema and subsequent reference standard
for de-identification of United States Veterans Affairs
(VA) electronic medical records. The benchmark was
created for private use only within the national VA
network. The researchers manually marked PHI as
risky based on the type of identifier. Deleger et
al. [10] introduced a public gold standard benchmark
based on annotating different types of clinical narrative
texts from the Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical
Center. Kumar et al. [8] introduced a new longitudinal
corpus of clinical narratives based on shared task corpus
from the 2014 Informatics for Integrating Biology
and the Bedside (i2b2) foundation, and University of
Texas Health Science Center (UTHealth) at Houston.
This corpus consisted of discharge summaries and
medical correspondences of 1.3K medical records for
296 patients. Further, Kumar et al. [8] developed a
new annotated de-identification benchmark from the
i2b2/UTHealth corpus. The developed de-identified
datasets are limited, which affected the system
performances [8, 9, 10].
English De-identification Methods: Next, we
describe research on NLP systems developed on
English PHI healthcare records for de-identification.
In 2007, Uzuner et al. [11] facilitated an analysis of
submissions into the i2b2 project which was organized
to research automating PHI removal from medical
discharge records. The tool evaluation consisted of
precision, recall, and F-measures on the ground truth.
The systems with the best performance scored above
98% in F-measure for all PHI categories. A few
years later, Hanauer et al. [12] examined the MITRE
Identification Scrubber Toolkit (MIST) for record
de-identification. After manual training rounds on a
clinical social work and history/physical medical corpus
of 360 documents, the tool improved performance based
on interactive rounds. After eight hours of annotation
time (round 21), MIST achieved an F1-score of 0.95.
Meystre et al. [13] extended the MIST analysis by
evaluating five de-identification state-of-the-art systems:
MIT, MIST (Mitre), HIDE, HMS, and MeDS on two
corpora: the 2010 i2b2 NLP challenge corpus and a
corpus of VA clinical notes. Overall, the authors found
that the different tools had certain strengths/limitations.
Liu et al. [14, 15] performed de-identification from
unstructured clinical texts via recurrent neural networks
(RNNs). Liu et al. [14] built and analyzed a long-short
term memory (LSTM) and RNN model on 2010, 2012,
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Figure 1. i2b2 PHI tag knowledge-graph
and 2014 i2b2 challenges. Liu et al. [15] extended
the systems and analyzed the new system based on a
corpus from the 2016 Centers of Excellence in Genomic
Science (CEGS) Neuropsychiatric Genome-scale and
RDOC Individualized Domains (N-GRID) clinical NLP
challenge comprised of 1,000 (600 train and 400 test)
annotated mental health records. The authors report
competitive performance metrics, with limitations
handling abbreviations, and specific PHI categories.
In general, the current research reflects on
limitations. First, models may be built with only
a small number of representative document types
limiting analysis precision on document types not
represented during training. Second, system evaluations
trained from a certain institution document structure
may not perform well on other document structures
not-represented during training. Third, some parts of
clinical notes, such as the medication section, may
have higher error-rates than other sections of the
same clinical notes. Fourth, reported models indicate
limitations to how entity recognition was performed.
Lastly, benchmark datasets used for evaluation can be
further improved by evaluating multi-rater interrater
reliability interclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) [16]
for more than one annotator to improve tag accuracy.
Non-English De-identification Methods:
Non-English NLP healthcare records PHI
de-identification has emerged within published research
during the last few years. Jian et al. [17] published
research on developing a private intra-organizational
Chinese de-identification benchmark, comprising 3K+
heterogeneous clinical documents, for unstructured
narrative data. They reported the challenges and
limitations of such English language-based techniques:
(1) PHI is sparse in Chinese medical records, and (2)
word segmentation and word morphological features are
more difficult in Chinese than in other languages. For
example, word capitalization is nonexistent in Chinese.
Foufi et al. [18] introduced a de-identification of French
unstructured clinical narrative data. Their techniques
applied a Named Entity Recognition (NER) model
to 11K+ French discharge summaries. They reported
a limitation in the analyzed discharged summaries
as they are often written in a hurry and contain as a
consequence, spelling, orthographic and typographic
errors, which can affect the de-identification process.
3. Data and Methods
NLP-centric risk identification appears to remain a
needed, but unmet, endeavor. In this section, we explain
the risk identification problem, the dataset used in our
experiments, and describe the methodology that we used
to identify risk in clinical notes.
3.1. Problem
The goal of this research is to classify clinical note
sentences into two risk categories, high or low, based
on whether or not each sentence is at risk of potentially
leaking sensitive information about patients. The input
is a sentence in a medical note. The output is one of
the two classes of risks depending on the presence of
sensitive words within the sentence.
3.2. i2b2 De-identification Data
In this project, we used the i2b2 de-identification
dataset to evaluate the proposed models [8]. We used
BeautifulSoup [19] to parse each clinical note into
sections for analysis of the actual text and analysis of
the gold-standard PHI tags.
Each gold-standard dataset file consists of an
XML file with a section for the actual clinical note
wrapped as a <TEXT><![CDATA[. . .]]]></TEXT>
and a separate section <TAGS></TAGS> listing the
gold standard sensitive information locations within
the note. For example, tags include gold standard
identifiers and locations within the clinical notes for
sensitive PHI information such as specifics related to
HOSPITAL, DATE, DOCTOR, USERNAME, NAME,
MEDICALRECORD, AGE, and IDNUM. Figure 1
shows our created knowledge-graph representation of
the PHI categories and tags within the analyzed i2b2
dataset. This dataset has labeled PHI into eight main
categories: Age, Contact, Date, Location, Profession,
ID and Name. Figure 2 shows the layout of a
gold-standard PHI labeled clinical note. All sensitive
information has been removed in the figure. As shown
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Figure 2. A sample clinical note structure in the i2b2 de-identification dataset




Table 1. Characteristics for the dataset
in the XML markups, each tag provides a location for
the sensitive information within the clinical note.
During the data cleaning, we split the notes
into sentences, using the Natural Language Toolkit
(NLTK) [20], and rearranged tags to the sentences. Each
sentence was then given a risk ranking based on the
gold-standard PHI labels. In fact, sentences may contain
more than one tag and could further be classified on a
larger risk scale in future research, but in this project,
we only focus on binary classes: low (0) or high (1).
In total, 22,541 sentences were given risk scores from
the tagged 514 clinical note dataset (Table 1). We used
five folds to group the dataset into training and testing.
The characteristics of the dataset in terms of the number
of sentences with tags (high risk) and the number of
sentences without tags (low risk) is seen in Table 1.
3.3. Features
Bag-of-Words: We used the NLTK [20] to
transform clinical note sentences into unigrams. After
the transformation, the number of times a unigram
appears in each text is counted to form the bag-of-words
(BOW) feature [21]. The number of features in
this model is equal to the vocabulary size found
by analyzing the data. We employed scikit-learn
CountVectorizer [22] with the binary parameter
set to true so that all non-zero counts are set to
one. Setting the binary parameter as such is useful
for discrete probability models, which model binary
occurrences as opposed to integer counts.
Word-Embeddings: We also employed word2vec
to transform words into vectors. We used the word2vec
model pre-trained on the Google News dataset which
gives a 300-dimensional vector. The word vectors were
averaged to form the final sentence vector using the
spaCy word2vec library [23].
Experimental Settings: We employed classifiers
with different parameters. The experimental settings and
results obtained are discussed in Section 4.
The risk classification was performed on the Harvard
I2B2 N2C2 project dataset. Specifically, the 2014
De-identification & Heart Disease dataset. Within the
2014 i2b2/UTHealth corpus we examined the tagged
dataset testing-PHI-Gold-fixed which is part of the
deIdi2b2 subgroup. Table 2 shows the PHI labeled tag
counts within the dataset that we calculated matching
the tag counts reported by He et al. [24].
We employed five classifiers from scikit-learn [22].
In the first experiment, for each feature set, we employed
























Table 2. Characteristics for PHI tags in the dataset
accepts binary values, and is used for discrete data with a
Bernoulli distribution. Next, we employed the Gaussian
NB Classifier, which is useful when working with
continuous values with probabilities that can be modeled
using a Gaussian distribution. Third, we employed
the AdaBoost Classifier, which is a meta-estimator
that adjusts outlying cases during classification such
that subsequent classifications focus on difficult cases.
Fourth, we employed the Random Forest Classifier,
which is a meta estimator that fits a number of decision
tree classifiers on various sub-samples of the dataset and
uses averaging to improve the predictive accuracy and
control over-fitting, with the default value of 100 trees.
Fifth, we employed the C-Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifier, a statistical learning framework with
an implementation based on libsvm. Lastly, we
employed LinearSVM which is computationally more
efficient than standard SVM as it uses a linear kernel.
For all the classifiers, the default scikit-learn
parameters were employed. For the Gaussian NB
Classifiers, the prior probabilities of the classes were
not specified and a portion of the largest variance of
all features was used at 1e−9. For the Bernoulli
analysis, we employed the default parameters to enable
Laplace/Lidstone smoothing. We also set the threshold
for binarizing to the default of none as it was presumed
to already consist of binary vectors. Similarly, the
AdaBoost four parameters were set to the defaults as
well as Random Forest, LinearSVM, and SVM.
3.4. Evaluation Metrics
We evaluated the mode using precision, recall, and
F1-score. Precision is defined to be the proportion of
cases classified as positive that were true positives. In
our case, the precision identifies the number of high risk
sentences that were in fact classified as having high risk,
in that they did contain sensitive patient information.
Recall, or sensitivity, is defined to be the proportion
of positive cases in the gold standard that are correctly
classified as positive. In our case, high risk sentences
that were identified as having high risk.
4. Results and Discussion
We examine performances of classifiers. We were
able to achieve different results with different classifiers
using Bag-of-words (BOW) features as summarized in
Table 3, which show the mean of 5-fold cross-validation
for the five classifiers. The LinearSVM classifiers
obtained the best cross-validated F1-score of 0.767.
Next, classifiers using word2vec feature out
performed previous models using BOW. The results in
Table 3 show the mean of 5-fold cross-validation for
the five classifiers. The SVM classifier obtained the
best cross-validated F1-score of 0.792. We will further
examine the measurements in Table 3 as interpreted
in our case of classifying/identifying sentences within
clinical notes that contain sensitive patient information.
Table 3 shows that different classifiers give different
precision and recall results. In our case of identifying
high-risk sentences, the recall measurement has stronger
security ramifications than precision ramifications since
recall measures the proper detection/classification of
high risk sentences within the clinical notes. Recall
takes into account the false negatives into the
calculation. The F1-score compares precision measures
with recall measures and in general higher F1-scores are
considered stronger performance.
Figure 3 (a) BOW and 4 (b) word2vec show the
confusion matrix for the top two performing classifiers
as they had the overall best performance. The top-right
corner is the measure of most importance for privacy and
security as it indicates the number of sentences within
the clinical notes which contained sensitive patient
information that were labeled improperly as low risk.
Figure 3 shows that the SVM classifier improperly
labeled 551 sentences as low risk; and Figure 4
shows that the SVM classifier improperly labeled 572
sentences as low risk when in fact it contained sensitive
patient information.
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Model Precision Recall F1-score
BOW Bernoulli Naı̈ve Bayes 0.906 0.498 0.650
Gaussian Naı̈ve Bayes 0.804 0.574 0.659
AdaBoost 0.799 0.576 0.652
RandomForest 0.867 0.678 0.757
LinearSVM 0.827 0.739 0.767
SVM 0.816 0.708 0.758
word2vec Bernoulli Naı̈ve Bayes 0.747 0.676 0.717
Gaussian Naı̈ve Bayes 0.695 0.768 0.742
AdaBoost 0.762 0.724 0.752
RandomForest 0.824 0.723 0.767
LinearSVM 0.794 0.740 0.765
SVM 0.825 0.758 0.792
Table 3. Model performances
Figure 3. Confusion matrix for system using
LinearSVM with BOW features
Error analysis: Further, we conducted error
analysis to examine why our model may make errors.
There are three steps in our model which may have
errors. First, the data parsing of the clinical notes using
NLTK saw the best performance over other parsing
libraries, but this could still be improved for more
properly parsing medical texts. Second, the feature
extraction could also be improved. Perhaps, our feature
extraction methods may not be adequately identifying
short/long sentences within the clinical notes. Third,
more advanced methods could be employed such as
grid search to find optimal parameters for the classifiers
used in this work. These directions of future work may
improve our current state-of-the-art model.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
The identification of risk and the de-identification
of medical records is now essential to uphold privacy
and security regulations of patient health information
employed for medical research and information
Figure 4. Confusion matrix for system using SVM
with word2vec features
sharing. Early literature in this domain consisted of
developing industry benchmarks for the evaluations of
de-identification techniques and methodologies starting
with private datasets moving to public gold standard
datasets. With the development of benchmarks,
the healthcare industry was enabled to further
openly analyze the performance of de-identification
techniques employing NLP. As the research showed,
de-identification success with English-based medical
records. With the emergence of translational services
such as Google Translate, the latest industry research
has been in exploring NLP de-identification techniques
in other languages such as Chinese, French, Serbian,
German, Korean, Portuguese and Spanish. Privacy and
security concerns will only mature with time.
In this research, we identified NLP as a useful
methodology to identify sentence risk of containing
sensitive information within clinical notes. Our
developed systems were able to achieve the
state-of-the-art of such a novel need. Future work
involves improving the data cleaning, sentence
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vectorization, classification, and the elaboration of
sentence risk levels. For risk levels, we could classify
sensitive information on a risk scale where identifiers
such as hospital name, doctor name, and perhaps age
carry less patient identifying risk than a patient name, a
patient medical record number, and other direct patient
identifiers. As clinical notes need to be de-identified
for data sharing and research, this work provides
fundamental contributions for employing NLP to enable
more robust healthcare.
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